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Abstract
This paper examines the macroeconomic impact of the first round of quantitative
easing (QE) by the Bank of England. We attempt to quantify the effects of these
purchases by focusing on the impact of lower long-term interest rates on the wider
economy. We use three different models to estimate the impact of QE on output
and inflation: a large Bayesian VAR; a change-point structural VAR; and a time-
varying parameter VAR. Our estimates suggest that QE may have had a peak effect
on the level of real GDP of around 11/2% and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation
of about 11/4 percentage points. These estimates are shown to vary considerably
across the different model specifications, and with the precise assumptions made to
generate the counterfactual simulations, and are therefore subject to considerable
uncertainty.
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The sharp deterioration of the global financial crisis in late 2008 led to the increased risk
of a severe downturn on a scale not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In many
countries the fiscal and monetary authorities responded with variety of conventional and
less conventional measures aimed at mitigating the effects on financial stability and the
real economy. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England introduced a number of
innovative policy measures. As Bean (2011) describes, these measures included enhanced
liquidity support, actions to deal with dysfunctional financial markets and large-scale
asset purchases. In this paper, we focus on assessing the macroeconomic effects of the
Bank’s programme of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), commonly referred to as quan-
titative easing (QE).
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England announced that it would
begin a large programme of asset purchases, mainly of UK government bonds or gilts, on
5 March 2009, at the same time as it reduced Bank Rate, the official UK policy rate, to
0.5%. Despite lowering policy rates to their effective zero lower bound (ZLB), the MPC
felt that additional measures were necessary to achieve the 2% CPI inflation target in the
medium term. The aim of the programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance
of central bank money was to inject a large monetary stimulus into the economy, in
order to boost nominal expenditure and thereby increase domestic inflation sufficiently
to meet the inflation target. Between March 2009 and the end of January 2010 the Bank
purchased a total of £200 billion assets, representing about 14% of UK GDP.
Most of the previous work on this topic has focused on the effects of QE on financial
markets (see Joyce et al. (2011)). Our work by contrast focuses on measuring the wider
economic effects of the Bank’s asset purchases on output and inflation. Understanding
the effects of QE on the wider economy is of course necessary in order to appreciate the
effectiveness of QE as a policy option during times of financial crisis. It is also useful for
understanding the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary policy.
The approach we take involves conducting counterfactual analysis, to assess what would
have happened had QE not been undertaken, which we then compare with a baseline
prediction which includes QE. Our analysis is based on three models. We use a large
BVAR, estimated over rolling windows, to allow for structural change; an MS-SVAR,
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where parameters are allowed to change at a particular time in order to capture regime
changes; and a TVP-SVAR, which allows us to assess general time variation in parameters.
The BVAR places more weight on past patterns in the data, by incorporating a large data
set and the minimum amount of economic structure. Such models have been found to
be useful because they allow the analysis of complex interrelationships between a large
set of economic data, which in our case involves the interconnections between interest
rate spreads and the real economy. The MS-SVAR and the TVP-SVAR employ a small
data set but they allow us to incorporate a more sophisticated treatment of structural
change. The underlying economic or structural shocks in these models are identified
through restrictions on the impulse responses (see, for example, Baumeister and Benati
(2010)).
We use each of the models to conduct counterfactual analysis of the effects of QE. This
exercise relies on the empirical evidence in Joyce et al. (2011), which suggests that QE
reduced medium to long-term government bond yields by about 100 basis points. To
produce counterfactual forecasts, we therefore assume that without QE gilt yields would
have been 100 basis points higher, ceteris paribus. For the purpose of the counterfactual,
we also assume that the effects of QE come solely through lower long-term government
bond yield spreads. We implement this effect on yields by adjusting the spread between
the relevant long-maturity gilt yield in each model and the three-month Treasury bill rate
(henceforth the government bond spread). The link between government bond spreads
and macroeconomic variables is given a structural interpretation in, for example, Estrella
(2005). One caveat here is that our models do not allow us to discriminate between the
effects of movements in bond spreads that come through term premia and those that
come through expected future policy rates. So to the extent that QE effects on spreads
come mainly through term premia (as much of the literature suggests - see Section 3),
and this has different macroeconomic effects to spread movements caused by future policy
rate expectations, this will not be captured in our analysis.
Our multiple models strategy is similar in spirit to the approach adopted by Chung et al.
(2012) in their analysis of the incidence of the ZLB interest rate policy environment
(though their paper only uses one model in its analysis of the Federal Reserve’s LSAP
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programmes). Bridges and Thomas (2012) also use a number of monetary models to
estimate the effect of the Bank of England asset purchases on the level of GDP and CPI
inflation. The use of different models that vary in their emphasis on data versus economic
structure increases our faith in the likely robustness of our conclusions. Our analysis
encompasses existing time-series models in the literature on the effects of unconventional
monetary policy (see for example, Joyce et al. (2011), Lenza et al. (2010) and Baumeister
and Benati (2010)) and extends this literature by including models that account for
structural change.
Results from the counterfactual analysis of the effects of QE using the large BVAR model
suggests that without QE there would have been larger declines in real GDP during 2009
and CPI inflation would have been low or even negative. The QE policy was therefore
effective in helping the UK economy avoid a deeper recession and deflation. The MS-
SVAR and TVP-SVAR models provide similar evidence, if anything suggesting that QE
had even larger effects on output and inflation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the United Kingdom’s
experience with QE and Section 2 reviews some of the related literature on the effects of
QE and other large-scale asset purchases on financial and macro variables. Our econo-
metric framework is described in Section 3, the data are described in Section 4 and the
counterfactual assumptions we use in our analysis are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
presents empirical results for each of the models. Section 7 provides a summary of the
key results, Section 8 notes the caveats to our analysis and Section 9 concludes.
1. Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom
Large-scale asset purchases in the United Kingdom were a culmination of a package
of measures designed to address the consequences of the financial crisis.1 These mea-
sures included the provision of enhanced liquidity support, measures to enhance market
functioning and QE or large-scale asset purchases (see Bean (2011)). The provision of
1Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2009) and Lenza et al. (2010), among others, provide a review of the various
measures used by major central banks in response to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.
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liquidity support was centred on the £185 billion Special Liquidity Scheme introduced
in April 2008, which allowed banks to swap mortgage-backed securities and other illiq-
uid assets for Treasury bills. A Discount Window Facility was also introduced to meet
the short-term liquidity needs of financial institutions requiring assistance. In addition,
there was the assurance that the Bank of England was ready to offer emergency liquidity
support at a penalty rate and against a broader range of collateral to otherwise solvent
financial institutions that were experiencing liquidity problems. To address market func-
tioning, an Asset Purchase Facility was created to allow the Bank of England to purchase
high-quality commercial paper and sterling investment-grade corporate bonds. Before
the QE policy was introduced, these purchases were financed by the issuance of Treasury
bills and the cash management operations of the Debt Management Office. Like the of-
fer of emergency liquidity support, the knowledge that the central bank was wishing to
purchase these assets may have improved overall market functioning.
The QE policy was first announced in March 2009 and it involved the Bank of England
buying assets, mainly UK government bonds (gilts), financed by the issuance of central
bank reserves. The effect of these purchases was to reduce gilt yields and to stimulate
demand through a number of channels. In normal times, reducing Bank Rate would be the
policy chosen to address demand shocks. However with Bank Rate at its effective lower
bound, and given the risk of undershooting the inflation target, the Bank of England’s
MPC had to use unconventional methods to ease monetary conditions further. The initial
MPC decision was for the Bank to make £75 billion of asset purchases. This was extended
subsequently to a total of £125 billion in May 2009, to a total of £175 billion in August
2009 and to a total of £200 billion in November 2009, with the purchases completed at
the end of January 2010.2 This represented about 14% of annual UK GDP.
Although there are a number of possible channels through which QE may affect the
wider economy (see discussion in eg Benford et al. (2009)), most analysis has emphasised
the so-called portfolio balance channel. This mechanism operates through QE purchases
bidding up the prices of gilts and other assets that are more substitutable for gilts than
money and this in turn stimulates demand through lower borrowing costs and wealth
2The analysis in the paper is for the first round of asset purchases by the Bank of England. The Bank
began a second round asset purchases in October 2011.
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effects. Portfolio balance models as described by Tobin (1969), among others, were used
by Joyce et al. (2011) to determine the financial market impact of QE. They find that
the predictions of these models are broadly consistent with the event study evidence for
the United Kingdom. We discuss this and other empirical evidence in the next section.
2. Related Literature
Most of the literature on the effects of QE and the use of other unconventional monetary
instruments has focused on financial market variables, as opposed to the effects on real
activity or inflation. This is primarily due to the difficulty of identifying the appropriate
counterfactual. In this section, we summarise the literature on the effects of QE or LSAPs
on financial and real variables, both in the United Kingdom and in other countries.
The assessment of the effects of non-standard monetary policies on financial variables has
mainly relied on event study methods. Bernanke et al. (2004), for example, provide a
comprehensive analysis of financial market reactions to various non-standard Fed policy
announcements that altered the relative supply of US Treasury securities. They conclude
that both changes in relative asset quantities and the expectation of such changes have
had an impact on yields or asset returns. These results are supported by VAR-based
term structure models. Bernanke et al. (2004) also provide some evidence that QE as
implemented by the Bank of Japan (providing excess reserves to maintain the interest
rate at zero and open market purchases of government bonds) may have generated lower
yields over the QE period, although there is weaker support from event studies compared
with those for the United States.3
Gagnon et al. (2011) provide an assessment of the first round of LSAPs conducted by
the Fed in the wake of the great financial crisis (commonly referred to as LSAP1). On
the basis of event studies of LSAP announcements, they suggest there was a contraction
in Treasury yields and yields on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) of about 90 and
110 basis points respectively. They suggest that the decline in long-term interest rates
3A comprehensive review of the financial and macroeconomic effects of QE in Japan is provided by
Ugai (2007).
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largely reflected the fall in risk premia generated by these purchases, mainly through
the reduction of duration risk. They also use a time-series econometric model of asset
quantities estimated on the basis of pre-crisis data to determine the impact of LSAPs,
which suggests slightly smaller effects. Using a different approach based on panel data
analysis of individual bonds, D’Amico and King (2010) find that LSAP1 had an effect
on longer-term Treasury yields of about 30 basis points for the 5-year to 15-year sector.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examine both LSAP1 and the second round
of Fed purchases (LSAP2) using an event study approach. They find evidence of a large
decline in interest rates in the first episode, but not the second (though this may reflect the
fact that the markets had already priced in much of the expected impact before the second
programme was announced). They identify a number of different channels through which
QE may work, such as duration, liquidity and the long-term safety channel. Swanson
(2011) revisits the Operation Twist experiment of the 1960s using event study techniques
and argues that it was broadly comparable in scale to LSAP2. He finds that both policies
reduced longer-term Treasury yields by around 15 basis points.4
The United Kingdom’s experience with QE in the recent financial crisis has been doc-
umented in a number of studies. Meier (2009), Dale (2010), Joyce et al. (2011) and
Bean et al. (2010), among others, have discussed the operational details of large-scale
asset purchases by the Bank of England and analysed various aspects of the impact of
these unconventional monetary measures. Meier (2009) used an event studies approach
to assess the impact of QE announcements and suggests long-term government bond
yields declined between 40 and 100 basis points following the initial QE announcement
by the Bank of England in March 2009. Joyce et al. (2011) provide a more comprehen-
sive assessment using event studies and portfolio balance models. In this framework, it is
assumed that gilts and money are imperfectly substitutable assets and a multiplier calcu-
lated from a Markowitz-Tobin portfolio choice-type model (see for example, Markowitz
(1952)) determines the effects of changes in the quantity of gilts on excess asset returns
in a portfolio with money, equities, corporate bonds and gilts.5 They suggest that QE
4Other supportive evidence on the effects of the Fed’s LSAPs programme is provided by Hamilton
and Wu (2012) and Doh (2010).
5Others have also used portfolio balance models to estimate the impact of LSAPs. See, for example,
Kimura and Small (2006) who suggested that QE in Japan had some positive portfolio balance effects
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lowered long-term gilt yields by about 100 basis points and that most of the decline was
generated by portfolio balance effects.
There are far fewer studies that try to estimate the macroeconomic effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy measures. One of the first in the current crisis was by Lenza
et al. (2010), who conduct a comprehensive review of the European Central Bank’s use
of non-standard monetary instruments in response to the crisis. The ECB embarked on
an ‘enhanced credit support’ programme (see, for example, Trichet (2009)), focused on
market liquidity, from mid-2009 to mid-2010 in addition to a multitude of other measures
intended to enhance market functioning introduced at the onset of the crisis. Lenza et al.
(2010) provide evidence, based on a counterfactual analysis using a large BVAR model,
that these measures were successful in reducing financial market dysfunction given the
noticeable contraction in money market spreads. They also find that these measures had
a positive effect on output and inflation but with a lag. Another VAR-based study by
Baumeister and Benati (2010) provides evidence of a significant macroeconomic impact
in the United States, United Kingdom and the euro area due to the observed decrease in
long-term bond spreads following asset purchases, though the magnitudes of the effects
output seem extremely large.
The impact of the Fed’s LSAPs on the US macroeconomy is also covered in Chung et al.
(2012), who find that the LSAPs were successful. In particular, simulations from the
Fed’s FRB/US macroeconomic model suggest that asset purchases prevented deflation
in the United States and reduced the rate of unemployment. The authors suggest that
the boost to the level of real GDP was about 3%, inflation was 1% higher and that the
unemployment rate was reduced by 1.5 percentage points compared with what it would
otherwise have been.
The theoretical underpinnings for expecting changes in asset quantities to affect yields
are provided in Vayanos and Vila (2009), who develop a model based on investors with
preferred-habitats (Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) offer empirical evidence in support
of the model’s predictions).6 But in most conventional New Keynesian models QE has
and reduced risk premia on some assets. Neely (2010) used a portfolio balance model to examine the
international effects of US LSAPs.
6Analysis of the effects of altering the maturity structure of government debt is not new. Informal
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no wider economic effects, unless it changes agents’ expectations about the future path
of interest rates through the signalling channel. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue
that there are no portfolio balance effects in these models because the reduction in private
sector portfolio risks resulting from central bank asset purchases is offset by a correspond-
ing increase in the riskiness of public sector portfolio due to the inherent uncertainty of
future taxes and spending, making QE purchases irrelevant through this channel. But
the literature incorporating the use of unconventional monetary policies into theoretical
macroeconomic models is steadily evolving. In more recent work, Curdia and Woodford
(2009) suggest that there can be some role for credit easing, which involves changing the
composition of assets on a central bank’s balance sheet but not for QE, which would still
be ineffective at the ZLB.7 But, when financial frictions or incomplete markets are cou-
pled with imperfect asset substitutability, changing the maturity structure of assets can
also affect asset prices. A useful starting point is the inclusion of Tobin’s idea of imper-
fect asset substitutability in standard New Keynesian models. For example, Andre´s et al.
(2004) and Harrison (2012) develop microfoundations for preferred-habitats and portfolio
balance effects which is supportive of a role for QE within a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) framework. In general, to explain the macroeconomic effects of QE
and other unconventional monetary policies fully, the (modified) DSGE model must cap-
ture the frictions that generate interest rate spreads and linkages between interest rate
spreads and the real economy. An insightful overview of related issues in this emerging
literature is found in, for example, Christiano (2011).
3. Econometric Framework
In this section we describe the econometric models used in the paper.
analysis of the preferred-habitat theory and empirical evidence on debt maturity structure are available
in, for example, Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967).
7Christiano and Ikeda (2011) also consider the role of credit easing using theoretical models with
financial frictions. ‘Credit easing’ in the United States is described as the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-
backed securities, which changed the composition of assets on the Fed’s balance sheet.
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3.1. Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
The seminal work by Sims (1980) introduced the use of vector autoregressions (VAR) into
macroeconometric modelling and VAR models continue to occupy centre stage. In this
paper we use Bayesian methods to estimate them. Specifically, we estimate a large BVAR
model similar to the model employed by Lenza et al. (2010). As our analysis involves
a large data set, BVAR models are useful to overcome parametrisation problems which
would otherwise be encountered when a standard VAR is estimated in large dimensions.
The BVAR model allows us to use a priori information to restrict the parameter space.
Our approach of applying prior information to a standard VAR model can be motivated
from both a Bayesian and a classical perspective. We view the use of Bayesian technology
as desirable mainly on pragmatic rather than philosophical grounds.
3.1.1. Notation and preliminaries
The model belongs to the general class of BVAR models for large data sets.8 Assuming
that all the variables in the large data set are in the vector Yt, we can write the model
as:
Yt = Θ0 + Θ1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ΘpYt−p + et (1)
where et is a vector white-noise error term, Θ0 is a vector of constants and Θ1 to Θp
are parameter matrices.
3.1.2. A normal-inverted Wishart AR(1) prior
As will be discussed later, our large data set comprises macroeconomic and financial
market variables. A good prior for BVAR models of the macroeconomy is a simple
random walk forecast; see, for example, Litterman (1986). Many macroeconomic and
financial market variables are characterised by persistent processes. In general, simple
autoregressive (AR) or random walk (RW ) models are known to produce reasonable
forecasts for macroeconomic and financial variables (over short horizons). We therefore
8See, for example, Banbura et al. (2010).
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choose a univariate AR(1) process with high persistence as our prior for each of the
variables in the BVAR model. With this prior, the ‘own’ first lag is considered to be the
most important in every equation in the BVAR. Specifically, the expected value of the
matrix Θ1 is E[Θ1]= 0.99× I. We assume that Θ1 is conditionally (on Σ) normal, with
first and second moments given by:
E[Θ
(ij)
1 ] =
 0.99 if i = j0 if i 6= j , V ar[Θ(ij)1 ] = φσ2i /σ2j , (2)
where Θ
(ij)
1 denotes the element in position (i, j) in the matrix Θ1, and where the covari-
ances among the coefficients in Θ1 are zero. The shrinkage parameter φ determines the
tightness of the prior or the extent to which the data influences the estimates. With a
tight prior the data has little or no influence on the estimates as φ → 0. For a loose
prior, where φ → ∞ there is an increasing role for the data and the estimates then
converge to the standard OLS estimates. To complete the specification of our BVAR
prior, we assume that the constant, Θ0, has a diffuse normal prior and the matrix of
disturbances have an inverted Wishart prior, Σ ∼ iW (v0, S0). v0 and S0 are the prior
scale and shape parameters with the expectation of Σ equal to a fixed diagonal resid-
ual variance E[Σ]= diag(σ21, ..., σ
2
N) . This is a conjugate prior with a normal-inverted
Wishart posterior distribution. The BVAR model is estimated using rolling windows to
account for structural change. Additional technical information on model estimation and
prior tightness is provided in Appendix A.
3.2. Change-point SVAR (MS-SVAR)
Our consideration of regime changes is motivated by the fact that since the early 1970s
the UK monetary policy regime has changed a number of times. Since how agents form
their expectations will have changed under different monetary policy reaction functions,
macroeconomic dynamics over this period cannot be easily described by deep parameters
of a single structural model. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early
1970s, we might loosely identify four successive monetary policy regimes in the United
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Kingdom. These are monetary targeting (not explicitly introduced until 1979 but mone-
tary aggregates were monitored from the mid-1970s), an informal exchange rate targeting
regime in the late-1980s and membership of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) from
1990 to 1992, inflation targeting after 1992 and more recently inflation targeting in a ZLB
environment with the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments.9 The use of
four different structural models might help us to understand agents’ actions inside these
regimes, but it would not be able to capture agents’ expectations that the policy regime
might change in the future.
The following MS-SVAR model allows us to model (in a reduced-form manner) changes
in the policymaker’s reaction function and to study how aggregate dynamics have been
affected.
Yt = cS +
K∑
j=1
Bj,SYt−j +A0,Sεt (3)
where the data vector Yt contains monthly data on the 3-month Treasury bill (Rt), the
10-year government bond yield spread (St) (defined as the 10-year government bond yield
minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate), annual GDP growth (yt), annual CPI inflation
(pit), annual M4 growth (Mt), and the annual change in stock prices (SPt); Bj,S and A0,S
are regime dependent autoregressive coefficients and structural shock loading matrices
respectively.
As explained in Chib (1998), the dates of (say, M) regime breaks in the model are
unknown and they are modelled via the latent state variable S, which is assumed to
follow an (M -state) Markov-chain process with restricted transition probabilities pij =
9The Bank of England was given operational independence for monetary policy in 1997. However,
the United Kingdom has had an inflation target since late 1992 and the Bank held joint meetings with
the Treasury ahead of policy decisions by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
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p (St = j|St−1 = i) given by
pij > 0 if i = j (4)
pij > 0 if j = i+ 1
pMM = 1
pij = 0 otherwise.
For example, if M = 4 the transition matrix is defined as
P˜ =

p11 0 0 0
1− p11 p22 0 0
0 1− p22 p33 0
0 0 1− p33 1

Equations 3 and 4 define a Markov-switching VAR with non-recurrent states where tran-
sitions are allowed in a sequential manner. For example, to move from Regime 1 to
Regime 3, the process has to visit Regime 2. Similarly, transitions to past regimes are
not allowed. This imposed structure (which is not necessarily more restrictive than a
standard Markov-switching model) implies that any new regimes are given a new label
(rather than being explicitly linked to past states as in a standard Markov-switching
model) and this allows us to isolate periods of interest (such as the current period) and
tailor our shock identification scheme accordingly.
3.2.1. Identification of structural shocks
In this model we identify four structural shocks: a monetary policy shock, a demand
shock, a supply shock and a shock to the yield spread. Following Baumeister and Benati
(2010), these shocks are identified using a combination of sign and zero type restrictions;
see Table 1.
We impose standard sign restrictions for the monetary policy, demand and supply shocks.
A positive monetary policy shock, which increases the short-term rate, will lead to a
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Table 1: Sign restrictions - MS-SVAR model
Shocks \ Variables Rt St Yt pit Mt SPt
Monetary policy ≥ ≤ ≤ ≤ ? ?
Spread 0 ≥ ≤ ≤ ? ?
Demand ≥ ? ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥
Supply ? ? ≤ ≥ ? ?
For variable definitions see discussion of equation 3.
compression in the yield spread, lower GDP growth rate and lower inflation. A positive
demand shock will lead to higher inflation and output, short-term interest rates, money
growth and stock prices; while a negative supply shock will lead to higher inflation and
lower output growth. On the other hand, a negative shock to the yield spread is assumed
to have zero contemporaneous impact on the short-term interest rate, but leads to lower
inflation and output growth.
The MS-SVAR not only accounts for different policy regimes but we are also able to
examine the effects of the policymaker’s inability to change the interest rates in order
to stimulate demand, as under the ZLB. We only do this in the most recent regime by
imposing the prior assumption that the policy rate does not depend on other lagged
endogenous variables. We show below that our benchmark model estimate of Regime 4
roughly coincides with the 2007-09 financial crisis (Figure 1).
3.3. Time-varying parameter SVAR (TVP-SVAR)
Another model that captures policy regime changes is the following TVP-SVAR:
Yt = ct +
L∑
l=1
φl,tYt−l + vt (5)
where Yt contains quarterly data on the 3-month Treasury bill (Rt), the 10-year govern-
ment bond yield spread (St) (defined as the 10-year government bond yield minus the
3-month Treasury bill rate), annual GDP growth (yt) and annual CPI inflation (pit).
The law of motion for the coefficients is given by:
φ˜l,t = φ˜l,t−1 + ηt. (6)
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where φ˜l,t = {ct,φl,t}. As in Cogley and Sargent (2005), the covariance matrix of the
innovations vt is factored as
E (vtv
′
t) ≡ Ωt = A−1t Ht(A−1t )′. (7)
The time-varying matrices Ht and At are defined as:
Ht ≡

h1,t 0 0 0
0 h2,t 0 0
0 0 h3,t 0
0 0 0 h4,t

At ≡

1 0 0 0
α21,t 1 0 0
α31,t α32,t 1 0
α41,t α42,t α43,t 1

(8)
with the hi,t evolving as geometric random walks,
lnhi,t = lnhi,t−1 + ν˜t.
Following Primiceri (2005), we postulate the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix
At to evolve as driftless random walks,
αt = αt−1 + τ t , (9)
We assume the vector [v′t, η
′
t, τ
′
t, ν˜
′
t]
′ to be distributed as

vt
ηt
τ t
ν˜t

∼ N (0, V ) , with V =

Ωt 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 G

and G =

σ21 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ23 0
0 0 0 σ24

. (10)
The TVP-SVAR model can be written compactly as
Yt = x
′
tB˜t +A0,tεt (11)
where xt=I⊗[1,Yt−1,Yt−2, ...] , B˜t=vec
(
[ct,φ1,t,φ2,t...]
)
, E (εtε
′
t) =I,A0,t=A
−1
t H
1/2
t P,
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where P is an othonormal matrix (PP′=I) that satisfies the zero-sign restrictions shown
in Table 2.
This model is substantially more flexible than the one discussed in the previous section. It
is not only consistent with variation in the policy rule, but also with deviations from the
rational expectations hypothesis. In this framework agents do not know the structural
parameters and they use simple forecasting models to form their projections about future
variables and, consequently, learn about the structure of the economy. This model seems
very plausible during crisis periods where agents have no idea how shocks have changed
the structure of the economy and they use simple ‘rules of thumb’ to learn about the new
state. During the financial crisis policymakers had to employ non-standard policy tools
and, arguably, it makes sense for agents to ‘abandon’ the rational expectation hypothesis
and use simple forecasting rules to learn about the structure of the economy; at least for
a short period. If agents behave this way we need to allow the parameters to vary over
time as in the TVP-SVAR model to assess the effects of QE.
3.3.1. Identification of structural shocks
The shock identification scheme used for this model is identical to the one discussed in
Section 3.2.1. The only difference is that two sets of restrictions have been dropped (those
associated with the M4 and Stock Prices series) because the dimension of the VAR in
this case has been reduced from six to four variables for reasons of tractability. Table 2
reports these restrictions.
Table 2: Sign restrictions - TVP-SVAR model
Shocks \ Variables Rt St Yt pit
Monetary policy shock ≥ ≤ ≤ ≤
Spread shock 0 ≥ ≤ ≤
Demand shock ≥ ? ≥ ≥
Supply shock ? ? ≤ ≥
For variable definitions see discussion of equation 5.
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4. Data
Our data set for the large BVAR comprises 43 variables, with monthly observations
covering April 1993 to September 2010. UK variables include those capturing real activity,
prices, money, the yield curve and financial markets.10 Given that QE is expected to affect
monetary aggregates and interest rates directly, the bulk of the domestic variables are
interest rates, interest rate spreads and monetary aggregates. To incorporate potential
international financial and economic linkages, we also include data for real activity, prices
and the policy rates for the United States and the euro area. We use log-levels for the
variables except those which are already in growth rates. The list of variables are provided
in Appendix A.4.
The SVAR models were estimated using monthly and quarterly data on a smaller set
of variables covering a longer period, from 1963 to 2011. The MS-SVAR uses monthly
data, from February 1963 to March 2011, for the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the 10-year
government bond yield spread (defined as the 10-year government bond yield minus the
3-month Treasury bill), annualised GDP growth, annualised CPI inflation, annualised
M4 growth, and the annual change in the FTSE All-Share index (stock prices). For the
TVP-SVAR model we use quarterly data, from 1968 Q1 to 2011 Q1,11 for the 3-month
Treasury bill rate, the 10-year government bond yield spread (defined as the 10-year
government bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate), annualised GDP growth
and annualised CPI inflation.
5. Counterfactual Assumptions
Our counterfactual analysis is based on the empirical findings in Joyce et al. (2011) which
suggest that QE may have depressed medium to long-term government bond yields (av-
erage 5-year to 25-year spot rates) by about 100 basis points. We implement this impact
10We obtain monthly GDP estimates from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
These estimates are obtained from statistical projection and involve a fair amount of interpolation.
Mitchell et al. (2005) discuss the methodology in detail.
11These data actually start from 1958 Q1, but we have used the first 10 years as a training sample to
calibrate the priors.
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on yields by changing the government bond spread, the spread between the relevant long-
maturity bond yield in each model and the three-month Treasury bill rate. The resulting
counterfactual simulations are conditional forecasts for real GDP and CPI inflation. We
examine two scenarios: a policy scenario and a no policy scenario.
Under the policy scenario, which we describe as our baseline model prediction, we produce
a counterfactual forecast taking the actual levels of long-term government bond spreads
and Bank Rate that were observed from March 2009 to the end of our forecast horizon as
our conditioning assumptions. We do not take the outturns for real GDP and CPI infla-
tion as our baseline because the changes in these variables may also be due to changes in
other factors that are not captured in the model. This means that we are only identifying
the assumed impact of QE on the growth and inflation profiles, and disregarding all the
other forces pushing up on demand. Consequently, the actual recovery may be higher
than our model prediction, which does not capture these shocks.
For the no policy scenario, we assume that long-term government bond spreads would
have been 100 basis points higher over the period from March 2009 onwards had QE not
been implemented.12 We also consider an alternative no policy scenario, where we adjust
government bond spreads by 100 basis points and fix Bank Rate at 0.5%. We describe
the two no policy scenarios as Bank Rate endogenous and Bank Rate exogenous.
To approximate the macroeconomic impact of QE, we compare the conditional forecasts
for real GDP and CPI inflation under the policy scenario with those for the no policy
scenario and take the difference between the two as our estimate. We are therefore
using the change in the slope of the yield curve as our sole metric to determine the
effects of QE on the macroeconomy. Lenza et al. (2010) and Baumeister and Benati
(2010) use a similar approach to examine the effects of unconventional monetary policy
on the macroeconomy. We do not examine the effects of other QE transmission channels.
Implicit in our approach is the assumption that QE operates through expectations and
that markets price in the total amount of asset purchases expected by the MPC. As noted,
£75 billion of asset purchases were announced in March 2009, and this was extended to
12This type of conditioning assumption is similar to the ‘hard conditions’ discussed in Waggoner and
Zha (1999).
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a total of £125 billion in May 2009, to a total of £175 billion in August 2009 and to a
total of £200 billion in November 2009. But evidence from event study analysis suggests
that by far the largest reaction in gilt yields occured around March 2009 (see Joyce et al.
(2011)).
In the BVAR model, we focus on the 5-year and 10-year government bond yield spreads
to assess the potential macroeconomic effects of QE, so the adjustments for the no QE
counterfactual are applied to these spreads. For the smaller SVAR models, we apply the
spread adjustment to the 10-year government bond spread.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Results from BVAR model
We set the lag order for our large BVAR model equal to one. For a model of this size,
standard information criteria are difficult to use, so we rely on serial correlation tests on
the residuals to arrive at the lag order. The residuals seemed to be well behaved, with
little evidence of residual serial correlation. We set the tightness parameter following
the approach used in Lenza et al. (2010). So the tightness parameter for the reported
results ensures that the standard deviation of the residuals of the Bank Rate equation
in the large BVAR is equivalent to those for the Bank Rate equation in a ‘small’ VAR.
We choose 12 variables for the ‘small’ VAR, including both UK variables and foreign
variables, to mimic the dynamics of a central bank monetary policy rule. The ‘small
VAR’ is therefore used to pin down the prior for the BVAR.
We estimate the model using a rolling estimation approach and only use data from August
2007 to September 2010 to conduct our counterfactual analysis. For these simulations, we
assume that under the two no policy scenarios the 100 basis point increase in long-term
government bond yields (which is implemented through a rise in the 5 and 10-year gilt
yield spread to the 3-month Treasury bill rate) occurs in the initial period and yields
remain at 100 basis points higher over the forecast horizon. We also conduct some
sensitivity analysis by looking at the effects of a 80 basis point and a 120 basis point
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increase in spreads under the no policy scenario. We also vary the persistence of the QE
shock by allowing the size of the adjustment on government bond spreads to vary over
the forecast horizon.
Figure 2 illustrates the estimated effects of QE on real GDP and inflation using the Bank
Rate endogenous scenario (first column) and the Bank Rate exogenous scenario (second
column). As with any VAR model, the forecasts become less informative as the forecast
horizon lengthens, since our focus is on the effects of QE, the counterfactual forecasts for
GDP and CPI inflation are shown for the period that they lie below the baseline forecast
which is typically around a year.
From the results it appears that the decrease in long-term government bond spreads
supported the level of real GDP during 2009 and prevented CPI inflation from becoming
very low or negative. From Figure 2 (first column), the Bank Rate endogenous scenario,
leads to a maximum decrease of real GDP of about 0.7% in September 2009. In the Bank
Rate exogenous scenario (Figure 2, second column), we observe a maximum fall of about
0.3% in the level real GDP in November 2009. The effects of QE on output are therefore
more pronounced in the Bank Rate endogenous scenario compared to the Bank Rate
exogenous scenario. This result is somewhat puzzling, as we would expect to see a larger
effect in the case where the Bank Rate is fixed. This is perhaps a consequence of the
fact that BVAR imposes little economic structure on the data. The effects on inflation
are very similar across the two scenarios, however, with QE having a maximum effect of
about 1 percentage point on CPI inflation. The peak impact occurs in March 2010 for
both scenarios. So our evidence for the effects of QE on real GDP would suggest that the
maximum effect occurs after about 6 to 9 months, while the maximum effect on inflation
occurs after about a year.
These are the maximum effects of QE. As noted previously, these are estimated by com-
paring the no policy scenario with the policy scenario which is a forecast conditional on
the actual paths of the relevant interest rate spreads and the actual path for Bank Rate
over the forecast horizon. The effects would be larger if the counterfactual were defined
as the no policy scenario relative to the actual data, as the model underpredicts output
and inflation over the period.
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We also considered a number of other adjustments for the no policy scenario, as shown in
Table 3. This included examining the effects of larger and smaller changes in spreads, but
since the shock is linear in the spreads the effects are simply proportional to the 100 basis
point adjustment. To assess the persistence of the shock we considered an alternative
adjustment profile for sensitivity analysis, which we call less persistence in Figure 2. In
this case, instead of assuming the effects on the government bond spread are constant,
we assume that without QE there would have been a 60 basis point increase in spreads
in the first three months, a 100 basis point increase for the next seven months and then
a gradual decline of about 11 basis points each month over the rest of the horizon.13
Unsurprisingly this resulted in slightly smaller effects. But, overall, the results under
these various alternative spread adjustment profiles were broadly similar to our central
case.14
Table 3: Maximum effects of QE: large BVAR
CPI Inflation Real GDP Level
Adjustment \ Estimate BR endogenous BR exogenous BR endogenous BR exogenous
80bp 0.82pp 0.85pp 0.61% 0.23%
100bp 1.03pp 1.07pp 0.72% 0.28%
120bp 1.24pp 1.28pp 0.83% 0.34%
Less persistence 0.96pp 0.94pp 0.65% 0.26%
BR is abbreviation for Bank Rate. The BR endogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on only the adjusted
government bond spreads. The BR exogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on the adjusted government bond
spreads and Bank Rate.
6.2. Results from MS-SVAR model
For this model, the number of the regimes is decided before the model is estimated.
This selection can be based on data-driven techniques - such as the marginal likelihood
criterion (see Chib (1998)) - or, as in this case, by prior knowledge. As noted previously,
Figure 1 shows the estimated regime pattern. We listed four monetary policy regimes in
13In subsequent months after the seven months increase of 100 basis points, the increase in spreads
will be equivalent to a decline of about 6%in the previous month’s increase in spreads. For example, the
increase in spreads in the 11th month is equivalent to 100 basis points minus 100*1/9. These types of
conditioning assumptions are similar to the ‘soft conditions’ described in Waggoner and Zha (1999).
14In addition, we also tried combining changes in yields with shocks to the money stock, with the
aim of combining quantity and asset price effects. This is consistent with a standard portfolio balance
approach, see Joyce et al. (2011). These results proved very sensitive to which monetary aggregate we
assumed was affected by QE and they are not reported here. Further analysis of the effects of QE using
a monetary approach are provided in another Bank of England Working Paper by Bridges and Thomas
(2012).
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the post-Bretton Woods era in Section 3.2. The first regime identified by the model ended
in the early 1980s, which, although covering a period when different regimes may have
operated, roughly coincides with the end of monetary targeting in the United Kingdom.
The second regime ended in the early 1990s, a period when the United Kingdom left the
Exchange Rate Mechanism and started inflation targeting. The end of the third regime
is around the outset of the recent financial crisis.
6.2.1. Counterfactual scenario by imposing alternative spread paths
This exercise is identical to the exercise in Section 6.1. Figure 3 plots the results from
this experiment, where we focus on the effects of QE over the period until the no policy
conditional forecasts return to the baseline. Similarly, the outcomes are grouped into two
categories: Bank Rate endogenous and Bank Rate exogenous. The Bank Rate endogenous
estimate (first column of Figure 3) is the forecast for output growth and CPI inflation
conditional on the adjusted government bond spread, under the no policy scenario. For
the Bank Rate exogenous estimate, the forecast is conditional on the adjusted government
bond spread and 3-month Treasury bill rate (the proxy for Bank Rate in this model) fixed
at 0.5% over the entire forecast period (second column).
Table 4 reports the peak effects on GDP growth and CPI inflation from these simulations.
For a 100 basis point contraction in spreads, the maximum impact on inflation and GDP
growth occurs in April 2009 using the Bank Rate endogenous estimate and in March
2010 for the Bank Rate exogenous estimate. The large initial impact of the stimulus,
using the Bank Rate endogenous estimate, occurs because in subsequent periods the
unconstrained policy rate declines in response to lower inflation and output. The results
for the less persistent case suggest that a staggered impact on spreads produces smaller
effects compared with the standard case, where we assume there is a 100 basis point
increase in every period over the forecast horizon, especially for the case where Bank
Rate is treated as endogenous. The MS-SVAR suggests that if we assumed the effects
of QE on spreads were less persistent, the impact on output growth and CPI inflation
would be smaller. These effects are more marked than in the case of the BVAR.
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Table 4: Maximum effects of QE: MS-SVAR
CPI Inflation GDP growth
Adjustment \ Estimate BR endogenous BR exogenous BR endogenous BR exogenous
80bp 1.03pp 3.01pp 2.14pp 3.68pp
100bp 1.31pp 3.38pp 2.72pp 4.08pp
120bp 1.59pp 3.79pp 3.29pp 4.45pp
Less persistence 0.75pp 3.11pp 1.57pp 3.96pp
BR is abbreviation for Bank Rate. The BR endogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on only the adjusted
government bond spreads. The BR exogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on the adjusted government bond
spreads and Bank Rate.
In the scenario where Bank Rate is exogenous, the effects on output and inflation are
larger and inflation would have gone into negative territory. This means that without an
additional policy instrument to affect expectations about demand, the economy would
suffer from deflation and positive real interest rates which would depress demand even
further (people expect inflation to fall, meaning consumption and investment goods are
going to be cheaper in the future and, therefore, they postpone consumption and invest-
ment into the future). Uncertainty about states of the world is another mechanism that
can squeeze demand. For instance, in periods of major financial crises, agents are partic-
ularly uncertain about the future and, in order to offset high consumption variations (due
to, say, the possibility of being unemployed) or/and to avoid big capital losses (from firms
going bust), they increase their precautionary saving, which squeezes current demand.
6.2.2. Impulse responses from MS-SVAR model
The structural identification scheme allows us to examine the evolution of the variables
in the different regimes following a particular shock. Focusing on the responses after a
shock to government bond spreads (the ‘spread’ shock), Figure 4 shows that this shock
has significantly larger effects in the recent regime. For example, the effect of the shock
(a 100 basis point decrease in spreads) on GDP growth increases from about 0.6% in
Regime 3 to about 2% in Regime 4.15
15The responses have been normalised to make them comparable across different regimes.
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6.3. Results from TVP-SVAR model
6.3.1. Counterfactual scenario by imposing alternative spread paths
Figure 5 and Table 5 show the results from the TVP-SVAR model. We focus on the
effects of QE over the period until the no policy conditional forecasts return to the
baseline. For a 100 basis point contraction in spreads, the maximum effects on inflation
and output growth occur in 2009 Q4 for the Bank Rate endogenous scenario and in 2010
Q1 for the Bank Rate exogenous scenario, ie three to four quarters after the start of
QE. However, the model prediction is hugely pessimistic relative to the data outturns.
The poor forecasting power of the TVP-SVAR may be due to how agents learn about
the evolution or structure of the economy. For example, if we consider the TVP-SVAR
as the reduced-form version of a structural model where agents use simple forecasting
rules to learn about the structure of the economy, then the results from these conditional
forecasts would suggest that the agents in this model learn very slowly.16 Since the initial
point of the forecast is in a downturn, agents seem to remain pessimistic for a long period
despite the stimulus from QE.
Table 5: Maximum effects of QE: TVP-SVAR
CPI Inflation GDP growth
Adjustment \ Estimate BR endogenous BR exogenous BR endogenous BR exogenous
80bp 0.87pp 3.20pp 0.56pp 2.64pp
100bp 1.30pp 3.63pp 0.86pp 2.98pp
120bp 1.71pp 4.09pp 1.15pp 3.29pp
Less persistence 0.87pp 3.42pp 0.56pp 2.82pp
BR is abbreviation for Bank Rate. The BR endogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on only the adjusted
government bond spreads. The BR exogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on the adjusted government bond
spreads and Bank Rate.
The forecast performance not withstanding, we can still evaluate the effects of QE using
the TVP-SVAR model. Using the Bank Rate endogenous scenario the effects of QE are
large and persistent reflecting agents’ pessimism about the economic outlook. For the
Bank Rate exogenous scenario, the effects of QE are much larger. This is similar to the
MS-SVAR and may be due to the fact that when the policy rate is exogenised recovery
16This is a standard feature of structural models with adaptive learning see, for example, Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
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can only be achieved by lowering spreads. In the case with less persistence of the QE
shock, the TVP-SVAR suggests that the effects on output and CPI inflation would be
commensurately smaller, broadly in line with findings for the MS-SVAR.
7. Summary of Empirical Results
Table 6 provides a summary of the key results from all three models employed in this
paper, showing the peak effects of a 100 basis point QE shock from the counterfactual
simulations. However, these effects occur at different times across the three models.
Although the models are strictly not directly comparable due to their different dynamic
structures and their informational content,17 they jointly illustrate the range of potential
macroeconomic impacts of QE.
Table 6: Summary table: maximum effect of QE (100 basis point contraction in spreads)
CPI Inflation GDP Level
Adjustment \ Estimate BR endogenous BR exogenous BR endogenous BR exogenous
BVAR 1.03pp 1.07pp 0.72% 0.28%
MS-SVAR 1.31pp 3.38pp 2.75% 5.13%
TVP-SVAR 1.30pp 3.63pp 0.86% 5.36%
Model Average∗ 1.21pp 2.60pp 1.42% 3.59%
(∗): Model averaging done with an equally weighted probability. BR is abbreviation for Bank Rate. The BR
endogenous scenario is the forecast conditional on only the adjusted government bond spreads. The BR exogenous
scenario is the forecast conditional on the adjusted government bond spreads and Bank Rate.
The final row of the table illustrates the effects implied by averaging across the models on
the basis of an equally weighted probability for inflation and GDP.18 The average model
prediction indicates that, without the 100 basis point contraction in government bond
spreads following the implementation of QE, output would have been between 1.4% and
3.6% lower while CPI inflation would have been reduced by between 1.2 to 2.6 percentage
points relative to the baseline model prediction.
The range of these estimates reflects the different assumptions made about the policy
rate in the two counterfactual simulations. Making Bank Rate exogenous produces a
17Although from Proposition 1 in Waggoner and Zha (1999) it is clear that the structural identification
scheme plays no role in the conditional forecast, in this instance we could only loosely compare these
models due to the different manner in which the reduced-form dynamics are modelled.
18To enable model comparison, we convert the GDP growth effects obtained from the smaller models
to an equivalent GDP level effect.
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much larger range of results across the models. We put more emphasis on the more
conservative model average results; the Bank Rate endogenous scenario. Our preferred
average estimates from the three models therefore suggest that QE may have had a peak
effect on the level of real GDP of around 11/2% and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation
of about 11/4 percentage points. Clearly, there is considerable uncertainty around all of
the estimates, which increase as the forecast horizon lengthens. These results should be
viewed as an attempt to quantify the macroeconomic effects of a 100 basis point reduction
in long-term interest rates. Of course, as noted earlier QE may have affected the real
economy in a variety of other ways and not just through its effect on long rates (for
example through confidence effects), but we have not investigated the impact of these
other possible transmission channels in this paper.
8. Some Caveats
We have noted a number of caveats to our analysis. We summarize these caveats in this
section and provide some suggestions for further research.
We do not identify how QE is transmitted into the economy, through either portfolio
balance or/and inflation expectations or other channels. However, we believe that this
does not alter our inference as we focus mainly on the reduced-form impact from a fall in
spreads on output and inflation.19 Although, the models used in this study are variants of
VAR models that capture different aspects of the evolution in macroeconomic variables,
arguably, a structural DSGE-type model could potentially provide some further useful
insights. However, as discussed previously, it is not immediately clear either what such
a model would be or how well it would fit the data. Research on DSGE-type models for
QE is ongoing. Our econometric models might be a useful way to take such models to
the data.
Also, any form of counterfactual exercise is uncertain, particularly so in this case given
19We have exclusively focused on the link between government bond spreads and macroeconomic
variables, ignoring other possible channels. However, the consideration of additional channels would
have complicated substantially the construction of the counterfactual exercise and rendered it potentially
more controversial.
26
the relative uniqueness of QE and the economic conditions in which it took place. We
have also chosen to consider only models that account for structural change associated
with parameter time-variation so as to minimise any biases arising from not accounting
for structural change. A byproduct of this choice is the likelihood that the estimates
of the effects of QE are more uncertain than would otherwise be the case. However,
as we have argued before, taking potential structural changes into account is extremely
important for the validity of reduced-form modelling of QE.20
Focussing our discussion on experiments where spreads fall by 100 basis points might
seem restrictive. However, we do consider alternative scenarios, which deliver reasonably
similar conclusions. A related issue is the possibility that QE may have influenced other
variables in our models but we only condition on the spread and may miss contempo-
raneous shocks to those variables from QE. However, Pesaran and Smith (2012) present
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model of GDP growth and bond spreads and
undertake a counterfactual exercise which indicates that the effect of a 100 basis points
reduction in spreads has similar positive effects to GDP as those we find in the current
paper. As the model of Pesaran and Smith does not contain any other variables, there is
no ambiguity as to the appropriate conditioning assumptions that define the counterfac-
tual exercise. As a consequence, we consider the results of Pesaran and Smith (2012) to
be a useful, relevant and positive robustness check on the results presented in this paper.
Finally, the usual caveats concerning the econometric specification, estimation and vali-
dation of our models apply. However, our use of state of the art econometric techniques
hopefully minimise the effects of such issues.
20A related issue is the possibility that the estimated time-variation in the parameters may reflect the
impact of policy changes rather than structural change. This may occur, for example, if the VAR models
omit important variables (see Benati and Surico (2009) for arguments along this line). Note, however,
that our findings on the impact of QE are relatively similar across three time-varying parameter models
that range from parsimonious to large scale. This provides some evidence that the estimated time-
variation reflects underlying structural change.
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9. Conclusion
In this paper we provide new results on the potential macroeconomic effects of the Bank
of England’s QE programme during March 2009 to January 2010. We employ a multiple
models approach, using three different time-series models. Results from a large BVAR
model suggest that without QE real GDP would have fallen by even more during 2009 and
inflation would have reached low or even negative levels. Results obtained from analysis
using an MS-SVAR model and a TVP-SVAR model broadly support those obtained from
the BVAR, if anything suggesting that the impact might have been even larger. Overall,
our analysis would suggest that QE was an effective policy option during the financial
crisis. However, the magnitude of its effects varies considerably across the different model
specifications, and with the precise assumptions made to generate the counterfactual
simulations, so these estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty.
We have qualified our analysis by a number of caveats. First, it is clear that any form
of counterfactual exercise is very uncertain, particularly so in this case given the relative
uniqueness of QE and the economic conditions in which it took place. Second, we have
chosen a set of models that, while different, are nevertheless related and, therefore, may
provide similar answers, which are subject to some uncertainty because they account for
structural change associated with parameter time-variation. Third, we have exclusively
focused on the link between government bond spreads and macroeconomic variables,
ignoring other possible transmission channels. Despite these caveats, our multiple time-
series approach provide a useful benchmark for assessing the macroeconomic impact of
QE.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Estimation of large BVAR model
In what follows we briefly discuss the estimation of the large BVAR described in 1. We
can compactly rewrite the VAR as:
Y = XhΨh +E, (12)
where Y= [yh+1, .., yT ]
′ is a T×N matrix containing all the data points in yt, Xh=[1 Y−h]
is a T ×M matrix containing a vector of ones (1) in the first columns and the h-th lag of
Y in the remaining columns, Ψh=[Φ0,h Φ1,h]
′ is a M× N matrix, and E=[εh+1, .., εT ]′ is
a T ×N matrix of disturbances. As only one lag is considered we have M = N + 1. The
prior distribution can then be written as:
Ψh|Σ ∼ N(Ψ0,Σ⊗Ω0), Σ ∼ IW (v0, S0). (13)
Note that Ψh|Σ is a matric-variate normal distribution where the prior expectation
E[Ψh]=Ψ0 and prior variance V ar[Ψh]=Σ ⊗ Ω0 are set according to equation 2. The
prior variance matrix has a Kroneker structure V ar[Ψh] = Σ⊗Ω0 where Σ is the variance
matrix of the disturbances and the elements of Ω0 are given by V ar[Φ
(ij)
1,h ] in 2. Since the
normal-inverted Wishart prior is conjugate, the conditional posterior distribution of this
model is also normal-inverted Wishart (Zellner (1973)):
Ψh|Σ,Y ∼ N(Ψ¯,Σ⊗ Ω¯), Σ|Y ∼ IW (v¯, S¯), (14)
where the bar denotes that the parameters are those of the posterior distribution. Defining Ψˆ
and Eˆ as the OLS estimates, we have that Ψ¯ = (Ω−10 + X
′X)−1(Ω−10 Ψ0 + X
′Y),
Ω¯ = (Ω−10 +X
′X)−1, v¯ = v0+T , and S¯ = Ψˆ′X′XΨˆ+Ψ′0Ω
−1
0 Ψ0 +Ψ0 + Eˆ
′Eˆ− Ψˆ′Ω¯−1Ψˆ.
In order to perform inference and forecasting one needs the full joint posterior distribution
and the marginal distributions of the parameters Ψ¯ and Σ. One could use the conditional
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posteriors in 14 as a basis of a Gibbs sampling algorithm that drawing in turn from the
conditionals Ψh|Σ,Y and Σ|Y would eventually produce a sequence of draws from the
joint posterior ΨhΣ|Y and the marginal posteriors Ψh|Y, Σ|Y, as well as the posterior
distribution of any function of these coefficients (for example, multi-step forecasts or
impulse responses).
Still, if one is interested only in the posterior distribution of Ψh (rather than in any
non-linear function of it) there is an alternative to simulation: by integrating out Σ
from 14. Zellner (1973)) has shown that the marginal posterior distribution of Ψh is a
matric-variate t:
Ψh|Y ∼MT (Ψ¯, Ω¯−1, S¯, v¯). (15)
The expected value for this distribution is given by:
Ψ¯ = (Ω−10 + X
′X)−1(Ω−10 Ψ0 + X
′Y), (16)
which is obviously extremely fast to compute. Recalling that Ψˆ is the OLS estimator,
and using the normal equations (X′X)−1Ψˆ = X′Y we can rewrite this as:
Ψ¯ = (Ω−10 + X
′X)−1(Ω−10 Ψ0 + X
′XΨˆ), (17)
which shows that the posterior mean of Ψh is a weighted average of the OLS estimator
and of the prior mean Ψ0, with weights proportional to the inverse of their respective
variances. In the presence of a tight prior (ie, when θ → 0) the posterior estimate will
collapse to Ψ¯ = Ψ0, while with a diffuse prior (ie, when θ → ∞) the posterior estimate
will collapse to the unrestricted OLS estimate.
Given the posterior mean Ψ¯ = [Φ¯0,h Φ¯1,h]
′, it is straightforward to produce forecasts up
to h steps ahead simply by setting:
yˆt+h = Φ¯0,h + Φ¯1,hyt, (18)
As shown by Banbura et al. (2010) it is also possible to implement the prior described
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above using a set of dummy observations. Consider adding Td dummy observations Yd
and Xd such that their moments coincide with the prior moments: Ψ0 = (X
′
dXd)
−1X′dYd,
Ω0 = (X
′
dXd)
−1, v0 = Td−M −N − 1, S0 = (Yd−XdΨ0)′(Yd−XdΨ0). Augmenting
the system in 12 with the dummy observations gives:
Y + = X+hΨh + E
+, (19)
where Y+ = (Y′ Y′d)
′ and E+ = (E′ E′d)
′ are (T + Td) × N matrices and X+ =
(X′ X′d)
′ is a (T + Td)×M matrix. Then it is possible to show that the OLS estimator
of the augmented system (given by the usual formula (X+′h X
+
h )
−1X+′h Y
+) is numerically
equivalent to the posterior mean Ψ¯.
A.1.1. Prior tightness
To make the prior operational, one needs to choose the value of the hyperparameter φ.
We discuss a number of methods for addressing this issue. The marginal data density of
the model can be obtained by integrating out all the coefficients, ie, defining Θ as the
set of all the coefficients of the model, the marginal data density is:
p(Y) =
∫
p(Y|Θ)p(Θ)dΘ. (20)
Under our normal-inverted Wishart prior the density p(Y) can be computed in closed
form (see Bauwens et al. (1999)). At each point in time φ could be chosen by maximising:
φ∗t = arg max
φ
ln p(Y) (21)
This method has been used by Carriero et al. (2010). However, as discussed there, such a
method may have a tendency to choose low values for the tightness parameter implying a
large weight on the prior. It is important for our purposes to give considerable weight on
the data. We therefore adopt an alternative approach whereby the tightness parameter is
chosen by matching the fit of particular equations in the large VAR to those from smaller
VAR models. Lenza et al. (2010) use a similar approach to set tightness. We find this
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approach produces a reasonable balance between the effects of priors and data that is
appropriate for our analysis.
A.2. Estimation of MS-SVAR model and selection of the number of
change points
We follow Chib (1998) and adopt a Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach to the estimation
of the MS-SVAR models. Here we briefly describe the main steps of the algorithm. The
Gibbs sampling algorithm proceeds in the following steps:
1. Sampling st:
Following Kim and Nelson (1999) we use the Multi-Move Gibbs sampling algorithm
to draw st from the joint conditional density f
(
st|Yt, cS,B1,S, . . . ,BK,S,ΩS, P˜
)
.
We impose the restriction that each regime must have at least N × (K + 1) + 2
observations, where N denotes the number of endogenous variables in the VAR, to
ensure sufficient degrees of freedom for each regime.
2. Sampling cS, B1,S, . . . ,BK,S, ΩS:
Conditional on a draw for St, the model is simply a sequence of Bayesian VAR
models. The regime specific VAR coefficients are sampled from a normal distribu-
tion and the covariances are drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution. For the
first M regimes, we use a normal inverse Wishart prior (see Kadiyala and Karlsson
(1997)). However, as described in detail below, we employ a (normal diffuse) prior
distribution for the VAR coefficients of the final regime, which is compatible with
the identification of the shock to the government bond spread. In our sample, the
recent financial crisis coincides with the final regime of the estimated VAR model.
The prior on the VAR coefficients in this regime implies that the policy rate does
not respond to lagged changes in other endogenous variables. This assumption is
compatible with restrictions used to identify the shock to the bond yield spread and
reflects the fact that policy rates have reached the ZLB.
3. Sampling P˜:
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Given the state variables st, the non-zero elements of the transition probability
matrix are independent of Yt and the other parameters of the model and are drawn
from a Dirichlet posterior.
We estimate the MS-SVAR model using 200, 000 replications of the Gibbs sampler and
discard the first 190,000 as burn-in. Figure A.5 plots the 20th order autocorrelation for
the key parameters of the benchmark model. These are close to zero providing evidence
in favour of convergence.
A.3. Estimation of TVP-SVAR model
The TVP-SVAR model is estimated using the Bayesian methods described in Kim and
Nelson (1999). In particular, we employ a Gibbs sampling algorithm that approximates
the posterior distribution. Here we summarise the basic algorithm which involves the
following steps:
1. The VAR coefficients B˜t and the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix At
are simulated by using the methods described in Carter and Kohn (1994). As is
common practice in this literature (see for example, Cogley and Sargent (2005)) we
impose the constraint that B˜t should be stable at each point in time.
2. The volatilities of the reduced-form shocks Ht are drawn using the date-by-date
blocking scheme introduced in Jacquier et al. (2004).
3. The hyperparameters Q and S are drawn from an inverse Wishart distribution
while the elements of G are simulated from an inverse gamma distribution.
Figure A.5 shows the recursive means of the retained draws appear stable, providing
evidence of convergence.
The lag length is set at two. The data sample runs from 1958 Q1 to 2011 Q1 and we use
the first ten years of data as a training sample that is used to calibrate priors.
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A.4. Data appendix for large BVAR model
The data set for the large BVAR model is given in Table A.4.
Table 7: Data appendix for large BVAR model
t
No. Variable Source No. Variable Source
1 US industrial production DS 23 20-year UK gilts BofE
2 US CPI DS 24 15-year UK gilts BofE
3 Euro-area industrial production DS 25 7-year UK gilts BofE
4 Euro-area HICP ECB 26 3-year UK gilts BofE
5 UK GDP NIESR 27 5-year 5-year implied inflation BofE
6 UK industrial production ONS 28 6-month Libor BG
7 Brent dollar oil price DS 29 12-month Libor BG
8 UK CPI ONS 30 FTSE All-Share index DS
9 UK-PPI ONS 31 FTSE All-Share dividend yield DS
10 UK-UEMP ONS 32 FTSE All-Share price-earnings ratio DS
11 UK house price index HF 33 UK exchange rate index BofE
12 10-year gilt - T-bill spread BofE 34 US dollar-sterling exchange rate BofE
13 UK consumer confidence EC 35 Euro-sterling exchange rate BofE
14 M4 BofE 36 T-bill - Bank Rate spread BofE
15 M3 BofE 37 3-month Libor - T-bill spread BofE
16 Retail deposit and cash in M4 BofE 38 3-month Libor-Bank Rate spread BofE/BG
17 Secured lending to individuals BofE 39 2-year gilt - T-bill spread BofE
18 M4 net lending to private sector BofE 40 5-year gilt - T-bill spread BofE
19 M4 lending BofE 41 Bank Rate BofE
20 Household M4 BofE 42 US federal funds rate Fed
21 PNFC M4 BofE 43 Euro-MRO interest rate BD/BG
22 OFC-M4 BofE
Data Sources: Bank of England (BofE), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), Bundesbank
(BD), European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission (EC), National Institute of Economic and Social
Research (NIESR), Datastream (DS), Bloomberg (BG), Office for National Statistics (ONS) and Halifax (HF).
Data transformation: We use log-levels for the variables except those which are already in growth rates.
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A.5. Charts
Figure 1: Regime estimation for the MS-SVAR model
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Figure 2: BVAR counterfactual analysis
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Figure 3: Conditional forecasts, MS-SVAR: GDP growth and inflation
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Figure 4: Responses after a spread shock in MS-SVAR
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Figure 5: Conditional forecasts, TVP-SVAR: GDP growth and inflation
 
No policy counterfactual simulations for GDP  growth 
(Bank Rate endogenous) 
No policy counterfactual simulations for GDP growth 
(Bank Rate exogenous) 
 
 
 
 
No policy counterfactual simulations for inflation 
(Bank Rate endogenous) 
No policy counterfactual simulations for inflation 
(Bank Rate exogenous) 
 
 
 
 
 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-09 Dec-09 May-10 Oct-10
No QE counterfactual (+100bps)
No QE counterfactual (+80bps)
No QE counterfactual (+120bps)
No QE counterfactual (persistence)
Model Prediction
GDP Growth
Per cent
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Sep-08 Jan-09 May-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 May-10
No QE counterfactual (+100bps)
No QE counterfactual (+80bps)
No QE counterfactual (+120bps)
No QE counterfactual (persistence)
Model Prediction
GDP Growth
Per cent
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-09 Dec-09 May-10
No QE counterfactual (+100bps)
No QE counterfactual (+80bps)
No QE counterfactual (+120bps)
No QE counterfactual (persistence)
Model Prediction
Inflation
Per cent
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sep-08 Mar-09 Sep-09 Mar-10 Sep-10
No QE counterfactual (+100bps)
No QE counterfactual (+80bps)
No QE counterfactual (+120bps)
No QE counterfactual (persistence)
Model Prediction
Inflation
Per cent
39
Figure 6: Convergence diagnostic statistics: MS-SVAR
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Figure 7: Convergence diagnostic statistics: TVP-SVAR
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